Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
The background and Terms of Reference (ToR) as provided by the European Commission for the present document are reported in Section 1.2 of the scientific opinion on the ad hoc methodology followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the criteria of Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9, and 8 within the Animal Health Law (AHL) framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
1.2.
Interpretation of the Terms of Reference
The interpretation of the ToR is as in Section 1.2 of the scientific opinion on the ad hoc methodology followed for the assessment of the disease to be listed and categorised according to the criteria of Article 5, Annex IV according to Article 9, and 8 within the Animal Health Law (AHL) framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017) .
The present document reports the results of assessment on Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal) according to the criteria of the AHL articles as follows:
• Article 7: Bsal profile and impacts • Article 5: eligibility of Bsal to be listed • Article 9: categorisation of Bsal according to disease prevention and control rules as in Annex IV • Article 8: list of animal species related to Bsal.
Data and methodologies
The methodology applied in this opinion is described in detail in a dedicated document about the ad hoc method developed for assessing any animal disease for the listing and categorisation of diseases within the Animal Health Law (AHL) framework (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017).
Assessment

Assessment according to Article 7 criteria
This section presents the assessment of Bsal according to the Article 7 criteria of the AHL and related parameters (see Table 2 of the opinion on methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017) ), based on the information contained in the fact-sheet as drafted by the selected disease scientist (see Section 2.1 of the scientific opinion on the ad hoc methodology) and amended by the AHAW Panel.
Article 7(a) Disease Profile
A recently described fungus, Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal), is causing several die-offs in salamander populations in Europe Spitzen-van der Sluijs et al., 2016) . This chytridiomycete fungus, which belongs to the order Rhizophydiales, produces two types of spores, motile (zoo-)spores and non-motile encysted spores (Stegen et al., 2017) , and causes the lethal skin disease chytridiomycosis in salamanders and newts (Caudata, tailed amphibians). Chytridiomycosis due to Bsal is characterised by multifocal superficial erosions and extensive epidermal ulcerations all over the body. Coinciding clinical signs include excessive shedding of the skin, anorexia, apathy, ataxia and death . This fungus is pathogenic for most western Palearctic salamander and newt taxa and is considered a major threat to the region's biodiversity Spitzen-van der Sluijs et al., 2016) . Salamanders can be resistant (no infection, no disease), tolerant (infection in the absence of disease), moderately susceptible (infection resulting in clinical disease with the possibility of subsequent recovery) or highly susceptible (infection resulting in lethal disease). It is not known which factors underpin the susceptibility/resistance of a species. Infection experiments demonstrated that frogs and toads are not susceptible to the disease, but can act as healthy carriers (Stegen et al., 2017) .
Bsal is believed to originate from Asia where it appears to be endemically present (Martel et al., 2014; Laking et al., 2017) and from where it was presumably imported into Europe through the trade of live amphibians.
3.1.1.1. Article 7(a)(i) Animal species concerned by the disease
Susceptible animal species
Parameter 1 -Naturally susceptible wildlife species (or family/orders) Fire salamander (Salamandra salamandra) is the index species, with several confirmed cases of mass mortality in the wild in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Spitzen-van der . Bsal infection was implicated in the death of Alpine newts (Ichthyosaura alpestris) and smooth newts (Lissotriton vulgaris) in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Spitzen-van der . The following caudata species have died in captivity due to confirmed and natural Bsal infection: I. alpestris, Salamandra algira, S. salamandra (including the subspecies alfredschmidti, almanzoris, bernardezi, fastuosa, gallaica, gigliolii, salamandra, terrestris, werneri), Salamandra corsica, Salamandra infraimmaculata, Triturus macedonicus, Triturus marmoratus, Notophthalmus viridescens, Taricha granulosa (Sabino-Pinto et al., 2015; Martel and Pasmans, 2017 (Martel et al., 2014) . Very few European species (e.g. Lissotriton helveticus) appear to be resistant to infection. A recent study by Stegen et al. (2017) demonstrated pronounced differential susceptibility between species. Highly susceptible species such as the fire salamander die even with a very low infectious dose. Disease course in the moderately susceptible Alpine newt depends on infectious dose: a high dose results in mortality, whereas exposure to a low dose results in highly variable scenarios, from persistent infections with eventual clearance of the fungus, to lethal infections. Based on Bsal infection dynamics in experimental infection trials (Martel et al., 2014) , Stegen et al. (2017) predict at least the following western Palearctic caudata taxa to be highly susceptible: all species belonging to the genera Salamandra, Euproctus, Neurergus and Pleurodeles. Given close relatedness to the highly susceptible genus Salamandra, species of the genera Chioglossa, Lyciasalamandra and Mertensiella are predicted to be highly susceptible as well. Based on Bsal infection dynamics, field data and phylogeny, species belonging to the following western Palearctic genera are predicted to be moderately susceptible (i.e. disease outcome is dependent on infectious dose): Lissotriton, Ichthyosaura, Triturus, Salamandrina, Speleomantes, Ommatotriton (Martel et al., 2014; Stegen et al., 2017) . Susceptibility of the genera Proteus and Calotriton cannot be estimated based on lack of experimental and field data and phylogenetic extrapolations.
Based on infection dynamics in experimentally infected animals and field data, Asian caudata belonging to the genera Tylototriton, Paramesotriton, Hypselotriton and Cynops are considered moderately susceptible (Martel et al., 2014; Laking et al., 2017) and at least these species are considered natural reservoirs of Bsal infection in Asia. At least some Asian salamander species belonging to the family Hynobiidae (genera Salamandrella, Hynobius, Onychodactylus) are considered tolerant (i.e. can be persistently infected in the absence of clinical signs and pathology) (Martel et al., 2014) .
Susceptibility of American caudata species is largely unknown. Based on results from experimental infection trials, Bsal is capable of causing mortality in species belonging to the genera Notophthalmus and Taricha (Martel et al., 2014) . Susceptibility of the largest caudata family (Plethodontidae) is currently unknown, although Bsal was shown capable of invading the skin of at least one species (Plethodon glutinosus) (Martel et al., 2014) . Species belonging to the family Sirenidae might be considered tolerant to infection with Bsal (Martel et al., 2014) .
Parameter 4 -Experimentally susceptible domestic species (or family/orders) No farmed species known affected, only captive species (see Parameter 1) are considered susceptible.
Reservoir animal species
Parameter 5 -Wild reservoir species (or family/orders) Asian caudata are generally regarded as natural hosts of Bsal and potential reservoirs. Bsal infections in apparently asymptomatic wild Asian caudata have been confirmed in Cynops pyrrhogaster, Cynops ensicauda, Tylototriton vietnamensis, Tylototriton asperrimus, Tylototriton ziegleri, Tylototriton uyenoi, Salamandrella keyserlingii, Paramesotriton deloustali, Hynobius nebulosus and Onychodactylus japonicus (Martel et al., 2014; Laking et al., 2017) . Bsal was found present in a museum specimen of C. ensicauda dating from 1861 (Martel et al., 2014) .
Moderately susceptible European caudata, such as I. alpestris, may equally serve as reservoir hosts (Stegen et al., 2017) : when exposed to a low infectious dose, this species can be persistently infected, shedding significant spore numbers, without showing any evidence of acquired immunity that protects against re-infection.
Although originally not considered susceptible to infection, anuran (frogs and toads) have recently been shown to be potential hosts, which can transfer infections to salamanders, acting as healthy carriers (Stegen et al., 2017) .
Bsal was shown to be present on wild small-webbed fire-bellied toads (Bombina microdeladigitora) from Vietnam and on representatives of the same species that have recently been imported in Germany .
Parameter 6 -Domestic reservoir species (or family/orders) No farmed species known affected, only captive species (see Parameter 1) are considered susceptible.
3.1.1.2. Article 7(a)(ii) The morbidity and mortality rates of the disease in animal populations
Morbidity
Parameter 1 -Prevalence/Incidence Thus far, Bsal has been demonstrated in 15 wild populations of salamanders in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Spitzen-van der and in five populations in captivity in Germany (1), the Netherlands (2), Spain (1) and the United Kingdom (1) (Sabino-Pinto et al., 2015; Fitzpatrick et al., 2016) . The total number of wild and captive populations of salamanders in Europe is not known.
The prevalence of Bsal in an infected salamander population varies according to the scenario. During a Bsal outbreak in fire salamanders (S. salamandra), the Bsal prevalence varied between 25% and 63% (Stegen et al., 2017) . Across a 10-day interval, the infection probability in fire salamanders was estimated at 0.33 (Stegen et al., 2017) .
In Vietnam, part of the presumed region of origin of Bsal, supposed Bsal endemism coincides with a much lower prevalence of 3% . Although proper prevalence studies are lacking, the low number of Bsal positive wild salamanders in China, Japan and Thailand (17 out of 432 samples, 3.9%) corroborates low but consistent prevalence of Bsal in natural populations in Asia (Martel et al., 2014) .
Parameter 2 -Case-morbidity rate (% clinically diseased animals out of infected ones)
In natural infections in captivity and in the wild, case-morbidity depends on the species involved and, at least for some species, on the infectious dose. For naturally infected animals of the genus Salamandra (both in captives and in wild animals), case-morbidity approaches 100%. Asymptomatic infections with Bsal in species belonging to this genus have not been confirmed so far. In experimental infection trials (Martel et al., 2014) conducted in some western Palearctic species, exposure to a single high dose (10 4 spores/animal) of Bsal resulted in a case-morbidity of 100%, except for the palmate newt (L. helveticus), which might be resistant to infection. However, exposure to a low dose (100 spores/animal) resulted in a lower case-morbidity of 6/9 in the moderately susceptible Alpine newt (I. alpestris), while remaining 100% in the highly susceptible fire salamander (Stegen et al., 2017) , suggesting case-morbidity to be a function of infectious dose in moderately susceptible species but not in highly susceptible species (for a presumed list of highly and moderately susceptible species, see Section 3.1.1.1).
In the supposed natural reservoir hosts (Asian caudata species), the case-morbidity rate also appears to depend on the infectious dose. While exposure to a single, high infectious dose resulted in a case-morbidity rate of 100% in experimental infection trials in the species P. deloustali, C. pyrrhogaster, Tylototriton wenxianensis and Hypselotriton cyanurus (Martel et al., 2014) , natural infections in Asian caudata belonging to the genera Paramesotriton and Tylototriton either in the wild or in captivity could not be linked to any clinical signs or decreased body condition (Martel et al., 2014; Laking et al., 2017) . Probably, infection pressure in natural populations is low (as corroborated by the low prevalence, see above), exposing animals to low doses of Bsal under natural conditions. Few species were designated as tolerant: the eastern Asiatic Salamandrella keyserlingii and the North American Siren intermedia (Martel et al., 2014) , with a supposed case-morbidity rate of 0%.
Mortality
Parameter 3 -Case-fatality rate As for the case-morbidity rate, the case-fatality rate of Bsal infections appears to be highly dependent on host species and infectious dose. Fire salamanders show a 100% case-fatality rate, deduced from field data (Stegen et al., 2017) , infection trials (Martel et al., 2014) and data from outbreaks in captive animals . The case-fatality rate for this species is independent of the infectious dose (Stegen et al., 2017) . During an outbreak in the wild, survival of infected fire salamanders was sixfold lower than survival in non-infected salamanders (Stegen et al., 2017) , resulting in loss of over 99.9% of the population (Spitzen-van der . Other species with predicted similarly high case-fatality rates that are dose independent include the western Palearctic genera that are listed as highly susceptible in Section 3.1.1.1. Mortality rates in Alpine newts have been shown to be highly dependent on infectious dose, ranging from 1/5 animals exposed to a single, low dose of Bsal to 5/5 animals exposed to a single, high dose (Stegen et al., 2017) . Western Palearctic species that have been listed as moderately susceptible in Section 3.1.1.1 probably follow a similar pattern of dose dependent mortality. How this translates to reduced survival in the wild and population declines is currently not clear for these moderately susceptible species.
As for the case-morbidity rate, the case-fatality rate of Bsal infections in Asian salamanders of the above-mentioned (Section 3.1.1.2) species, probably strongly depends on infectious dose. When exposed to a single, high Bsal dose, 4/8 C. pyrrhogaster, 3/4 P. deloustali and 3/5 H. cyanurus died. Mortality due to Bsal has not been reported in Asian caudate, neither in the wild nor in captivity, suggesting the case-fatality rate in natural infections to be low in these species.
Experimental infection trials and field data suggested a very low case-fatality rate in some caudata considered tolerant after successful infection with a single, high dose of Bsal: Salamandrella keyserlingii and Siren intermedia (Martel et al., 2014) . Human infection has never been reported. To date, there are no report of zoonotic cases linked to Bsal infection, which is considered not zoonotic.
3.1.1.4. Article 7(a)(iv) The resistance to treatments, including antimicrobial resistance Parameter 1 -Resistant strain to any treatment even at laboratory level None reported.
3.1.1.5. Article 7(a)(v) The persistence of the disease in an animal population or the environment
Animal population
Parameter 1 -Duration of infectious period in animals
The infectious period, here defined as the period during which detectable amounts of Bsal can be demonstrated in skin swabs from infected salamanders depends on the host species, the infectious dose and the environmental conditions (Stegen et al., 2017) . Differences in the infectious period between Bsal strains cannot be excluded at this point. When exposed to a single high dose, highly susceptible species such as fire salamanders (see Section 3.1.1.1) generally die within 15 days after exposure at a constant temperature of 15°C, whereas at 4°C or when exposed to a lower Bsal dose, the duration of Bsal shedding and time to mortality are significantly longer (Stegen et al., 2017) . Moderately susceptible species (see Section 3.1.1.1) can develop chronic infections and shed Bsal for at least 4 months (Martel et al., 2014; Stegen et al., 2017) . The duration of the infectious period in natural populations is currently not known.
Parameter 2 -Presence and duration of latent infection period
The presence of latent infections (defined as infected but not yet infectious) has not been demonstrated yet.
Parameter 3 -Presence and duration of the pathogen in healthy carriers
The existence of healthy pathogen carriers (they are infectious but asymptomatic) has been hypothesised to mainly occur in the region of Bsal origin, Asia . The duration of the infection in healthy carriers in nature is not known. Experimental infection of species that may be healthy carriers in the wild (Cynops, Paramesotriton) demonstrates shedding of Bsal by infected animals for up to 4 months after exposure to a single high dose of Bsal, at a constant temperature of 15°C. Based on infection trials, healthy carriers may be common in moderately susceptible European caudata species as well (Stegen et al., 2017) , in which Bsal was demonstrated up to more than 3 months post-exposure. Since this long-term persistence did not result in protection against re-infection, these species may prove suitable Bsal carriers for long periods of times (Stegen et al., 2017) . Infections experiments also demonstrated European anura (e.g. Alytes) can act as healthy carriers (Stegen et al., 2017) .
Environment
Parameter 4 -Length of survival (dpi) of the agent and/or detection of DNA in selected matrices (soil, water, air) from the environment (scenarios: high and low T)
Bsal produces encysted spores that float on water and are the infective and resistant form of the agent in the environment, (Stegen et al., 2017) . Survival has been assessed in pond water where spores remain infectious for at least 31 days at 15°C.
Infected salamanders contaminate forest soil, which can transmit infection to na € ıve animals. Bsal DNA was detected in forest soil up to 200 days in experimentally inoculated soil samples. Contaminated forest soil remains infective for at least 48 h (Stegen et al., 2017) .
3.1.1.6. Article 7(a)(vi) The routes and speed of transmission of the disease between animals, and, when relevant, between animals and humans
Routes of transmission
Parameter 1 -Types of routes of transmission from animal to animal (horizontal, vertical)
Vertical transmission is likely in species that produce metamorphed offspring (Salamandra atra and Salamandra lanzai, some S. salamandra subspecies) but this needs further investigation. Larvae of fire salamanders could not be experimentally infected with Bsal (Van Rooij et al., 2015) . The tipping point when larval salamanders become susceptible during metamorphosis is not known. Horizontal transmission within and between caudata species has been demonstrated (Martel et al., 2014) but also from anurans to fire salamanders (Stegen et al., 2017) . Transmission is likely to occur during animalanimal contact (e.g. during courtship, territorial interactions) and indirectly by encysted spores floating on water, motile zoospores or by contaminated forest soil (Stegen et al., 2017) . Adherence of encysted spores to inert matrices (e.g. scales on bird feet) may promote large distance spread (Stegen et al., 2017) .
Parameter 2 -Types of routes of transmission between animals and humans (direct, indirect, including food-borne)
Not applicable because no infections in humans have been reported.
Speed of transmission
Parameter 3 -Incidence between animals and, when relevant, between animals and humans Salamanders carrying high infection loads can spread Bsal infection to na € ıve salamanders within 2 h of cohousing (Martel et al., 2014) .
Parameter 4 -Transmission rate (beta) (from R 0 and infectious period) between animals and, when relevant, between animals and humans Infection probability in a naturally infected fire salamander population across a 10-day interval was estimated at 0.33 (CI: 0.169-0.512) .
3.1.1.7. Article 7(a)(vii) The absence or presence and distribution of the disease in the Union, where the disease is not present in the Union, the risk of its introduction into the Union
Presence and distribution
Parameter 1 -Map where the disease is present in EU
The disease has been detected in collections of captive salamanders (Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom (Sabino-Pinto et al., 2015; Fitzpatrick et al., 2016) ) and in natural populations (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands) of salamanders. A map of the currently known localities of affected natural populations is presented in Figure 1 .
Parameter 2 -Type of epidemiological occurrence (sporadic, epidemic, endemic) at MS level All occurrences presently known in natural populations are linked to mass mortality events with population declines in at least Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Bsal among wild amphibians in Europe is more widely distributed than previously known, which can either indicate recent spread of the fungus or identified infected sites that were previously undetected (Spitzen-van der Sluijs et al., 2016).
Risk of introduction
Parameter 3 -Routes of possible introduction Precise routes of introduction are currently not known and thus this paragraph is largely hypothetical. A likely route of introduction is through the trade in live, infected amphibians (Martel et al., 2014; Laking et al., 2017) . Other sources (e.g. aquatic plants) cannot be excluded, given the presence of an environmentally resistant life stage of Bsal. Direct or indirect contact with native caudata may result in Bsal introduction: direct contact, e.g. by release of infected, captive caudata in garden ponds containing native caudata; indirect contact, e.g. by the use of fomites (buckets, containers, dipnets, etc.) both for care-taking of pet caudata and in field activities involving native caudata or by disposal of contaminated terrarium content (soil, water) in caudata habitat.
Introduction in na € ıve regions from outbreak areas may be possible through (a) expansion via overlapping amphibian populations (b) movement by humans of infected animals and (c) mechanical vectors (wildlife, humans (contaminated clothes), fomites (materials and machines used during field activities), contaminated water and/or soil).
Parameter 4 -Number of animal moving and/or shipment size
No official quantitative data are available with regard to movements of amphibians for the trade (research, exhibitions, zoo, aquaria, etc.) within the European Union (EU) or between the EU and third countries given the lack of a unique harmonised system commodity code identifier. Of the most widely available pet newt species (Hypselotriton orientalis), 2.3 million newts have been imported into the USA between 2001 and 2009 (Herrel and van der Meijden, 2014) . This species is a potential carrier of Bsal. Similar numbers have likely been imported in the EU. Other Asian caudata that may be potential carriers of Bsal and that regularly turn up in the EU trade are species of the genera Pachytriton, Paramesotriton, Cynops, Tylototriton and Salamandrella. Approximately 156,000 salamanders, mostly including shipments with Bsal risk, are reported to be annually imported into the USA (Yap et al., 2015) . In 2013, 21,000 individuals (Paramesotriton chinensis, N. viridescens and Cynops spp.) were imported into the Netherlands (Spitzen-van der .
Parameter 5 -Duration of infectious period in animal and/or commodity Depending on the species, infectious dose, temperature, the duration of the infectious period is ranging from 2 weeks to more than 4 months (see Section 3.1.1.5). Infected soil remains infective for at least 2 days, pond water for at least 1 month (Stegen et al., 2017) .
Parameter 6 -List of control measures at border (testing, quarantine, etc.) None currently installed.
Parameter 7 -Presence and duration of latent infection and/or carrier status
The existence of asymptomatic pathogen carriers has been hypothesised to mainly occur in the region of Bsal origin, Asia . The duration of the infection in asymptomatic carriers in nature is not known. Experimental infection of species that may be asymptomatic carriers in the wild (Cynops, Paramesotriton) demonstrate shedding of Bsal by infected animals for up to 4 months after exposure to a single high dose of Bsal, at a constant temperature of 15°C.
Parameter 8 -Risk of introduction
The trade in live animals likely constitutes a constant threat of introduction of Bsal and other amphibian pathogens. However, Bsal prevalence in trade is likely low. Of 2,335 samples of captive amphibians examined, only 3 were positive for Bsal (Martel et al., 2014) . It is therefore expected that only the importation of large numbers of potential Bsal carrier species into the EU constitutes a significant risk.
The risk of other potential, non-amphibian routes of entry can currently not be estimated.
3.1.1.8. Article 7(a)(viii) The existence of diagnostic and disease control tools
Diagnostic tools
Parameter 1 -Existence of diagnostic tools Non-invasive sampling can be performed on live amphibians by collecting skin swabs for the highly specific detection of Bsal DNA (using quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR)) . The limit of detection of the fungus is 0.1 genomic equivalents (GE). The samples that can be analysed by qPCR include swabs, toe clips and skin samples . The qPCR is able to detect the fungus before the animal shows clinical signs of disease (Martel et al., 2014) .
Alternatives to qPCR include histopathology of skin, immunohistochemistry using polyclonal antibodies or the use of a recently developed lateral-flow technique (Dillon et al., 2017) . These methods fail to discriminate between Bsal and its sister species Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis (Bd) and have a lower sensitivity than the qPCR method (Dillon et al., 2017) .
Control tools
Parameter 2 -Existence of control tools Bsal in captive caudata can be controlled using a combination of proper quarantine and entry control for Bsal of any newly acquired animal. Quarantine should consist of a period of at least 40 days, preferably at a Bsal permissive temperature (optimum of 15°C) during which overall health of the animal should be assessed and a skin swab should be collected for quantification of Bsal DNA using qPCR during the last week of the quarantine period (Blooi et al., 2015b) . During this period, all materials that have come into contact (directly or indirectly) with the quarantined animal should be properly disinfected. This can be done by chemical decontamination. An overview of effective disinfection protocols is given in Table 1 . Hydrogen peroxide shows poor activity against Bsal. Heat treatment is to be expected to result in fast killing of all life stages of Bsal but needs further study. The fungus poorly tolerates high temperatures: Bsal cultures are killed after incubation for 5 days at 25°C (Blooi et al., 2015a) . If Bsal responds to heat as its sister species Bd, exposing materials to 60°C for 5 min or 100°C for 1 min should be efficient (Johnson et al., 2003) .
If salamanders are infected by Bsal in captivity, the infection can be effectively treated either using temperature treatment (Blooi et al., 2015b) or chemotherapeutics (Blooi et al., 2015a) , which are capable of clearing the infection. Collections of captive caudata can be cleared from Bsal infection by keeping the infected salamanders at 25°C for 10 days (Blooi et al., 2015a) . For salamander species that do not tolerate these relatively high temperatures, an alternative consists on the combination of topical application of voriconazole with polymyxin E and keeping the infected salamanders at 20°C for 10 days (Blooi et al., 2015a) . Post-treatment assessment of Bsal absence is obligatory and the treatment may need repeating until total clearance.
Controlling Bsal in natural populations of salamanders is currently limited to measures that prevent Bsal introduction. No curative measures are available to mitigate Bsal in natural caudata populations once the pathogen is established. As an emergency measure to safeguard highly valuable populations from extinction, the development of captive assurance colonies is recommended (Stegen et al., 2017) . (Fitzpatrick et al., 2016; Sabino-Pinto et al., 2015) .
Potential
In wild populations: recent modelling of Bsal infection and disease across Europe based on its native niche (Beukema et al., 2017) predicts the potential of Bsal to affect caudata populations in all European nations, with high suitability of regions that are of special conservation interest for caudata (regions with high caudata endemicity such as the Iberian peninsula, Corsica and Sardinia, Italy and the Alps and the countries bordering the Adriatic sea).
In captive salamanders: Bsal has the potential to spread between collections among all European countries (and beyond), probably mainly through traffic in live caudata.
The loss of production due to the disease In moderately susceptible hosts, the infection results in skin infection, either or not coinciding with cutaneous disease (skin ulceration) and potentially leading to death (Martel et al., 2014; Stegen et al., 2017) .
Tolerant hosts do not show obvious signs of reduced welfare after infection.
The impact of the disease on biodiversity and the environment
Biodiversity
Parameter 1 -Endangered wild species affected: listed species as in CITES and/or IUCN list
Bsal is currently expanding its range, approaching several species listed as endangered by IUCN and/or included in the Habitat's directive. Niche modelling demonstrates that most European species that are estimated susceptible to Bsal are at risk of population crashes (Beukema et al., 2017) . A tentative list of species, threatened by Bsal, with their established or estimated level of susceptibility (see Section 3.1.1.1) is provided in Table 2 . Consequences for the demography and biodiversity of natural populations are not entirely clear yet but probably of high relevance. In natural populations, mortality due to Bsal has been confirmed extensively in fire salamanders (S. salamandra), with crashes reducing the populations by over 99.9% (Spitzen-van der Sluijs et al., 2016). Fire salamander populations undergo a 90% decline within 6 months after the onset of the disease (Stegen et al., 2017) . Mortality has been observed in newts (I. alpestris, L. vulgaris) but the impact of Bsal on natural newt populations is currently unclear.
Environment
Parameter 3 -Capacity of the pathogen to persist in the environment and cause mortality in wildlife
Bsal is a wildlife pathogen causing extinction events in fire salamander populations Stegen et al., 2017) and probable extinction in several highly susceptible and threatened European species (see Section 3.1.1.1 and Table 1 ). For persistence in the environment, see Section 3.1.1.5 Parameter 4.
3.1.3. Article 7(c) Its potential to generate a crisis situation and its potential use in bioterrorism
Parameter 1 -Listed in OIE/CFSPH classification of pathogens This is a recently discovered pathogenic fungus , recently added to the OIE list of aquatic animal diseases. 1 Further, it is not included in the Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH) list of Bioterrorism and High Consequence Pathogen (CFSPH, 2017 No OIE certified diagnostic tools are available. The only available qPCR protocol currently routinely used internationally as the reference standard for Bsal detection in skin and skin swabs is the one developed by Blooi et al. (2013) that has been used in several laboratories providing consistent results (Sabino-Pinto et al., 2015; Fitzpatrick et al., 2016; Spitzen-van der Sluijs et al., 2016) . The diagnostic characteristics of this test has been recently evaluated by Thomas et al. (submitted) and, despite some limitations linked to the limited sample size used for its validation and being based on a single laboratory study, study results are reported below under 'effectiveness'.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 -Se and Sp of diagnostic test
The diagnostic sensitivity (DSe), diagnostic specificity (DSp) and reproducibility of the Bsal qPCR developed by Blooi et al. (2013) were evaluated using DNA samples from 26 experimentally infected and 12 non-infected salamanders in three external labs (see above under 'availability'). Exact binomial confidence intervals were obtained using the test results in the three laboratories using the method of Clopper-Pearson (Brown et al., 2001) . The DSe was 96% (95% IC: 80.4-99.9%) in one laboratory and 100% (95% IC: 86.6-100%) in two laboratories. The DSp in all three laboratories was 12 out 12 (100%; 95% IC: 73-100) (estimates were based on data used in Thomas et al. (submitted) , i.e. the dichotomous outcome of the test performed in three different laboratories).
Feasibility
Parameter 3 -Type of sample matrix to be tested (blood, tissue, etc.) In live animals, non-invasively collected samples (skin swabs) can be easily and quickly collected Martel et al., 2013 Martel et al., , 2014 . A cotton-tipped swab should be rubbed firmly over the abdominal area, ventral tail and foot 10 times each and subsequently stored dry, and preferably frozen to avoid DNA degradation.
In dead animals, qPCR on skin tissue can be combined with histopathology of the skin and, if available, immunohistochemistry White et al., 2016) .
Article 7(d)(ii) Vaccination
Availability
Parameter 1 -Types of vaccines available on the market (live, inactivated, DIVA, etc.)
None.
Parameter 2 -Availability/production capacity (per year) Not applicable since no vaccines have been developed.
Effectiveness
Parameter 3 -Field protection as reduced morbidity (as reduced susceptibility to infection and/or to disease)
Vaccination of caudata of Bsal does not seem to be a promising measure for future development. Repeated cycles of experimental infection/treatment in two salamander species (fire salamanders and Alpine newts) did not induce any obvious protection against re-infection and clinical disease (Stegen et al., 2017) .
Parameter 4 -Duration of protection
Not applicable since no vaccine is available.
Feasibility
Parameter 5 -Way of administration Not applicable since no vaccine is available.
Article 7(d)(iii) Medical treatments
Availability
Parameter 1 -Types of drugs available on the market Only infected animals in captivity can be efficiently treated. The treatment of choice consists of heat treatment (25°C for 10 days) (see Section 3.1.1.8 Parameter 2). Cocktails of drugs (topical treatment combining polymyxin E submersion baths and voriconazole sprayed twice a day for 10 days at an ambient temperature of 20°C) can be used (Blooi et al., 2015b) .
Parameter 2 -Availability/production capacity (per year) Not applicable since temperature treatment is the preferred option. Voriconazole is preferably used as the intravenous formulation for humans and is not registered for use in amphibians. Polymyxin E is widely used in veterinary medicine.
Effectiveness
Parameter 3 -Therapeutic effects on the field (effectiveness)
Heat and antimicrobial treatment can be 100% effective in eliminating Bsal infection in captive caudata. Since the number of Bsal strains available is currently very limited; however, it is not known to which extent these treatment protocols are applicable to Bsal in general (for example, a strain with a higher thermal tolerance may survive the heat treatment protocol; sensitivity to antimicrobial drugs may vary between strains).
Feasibility
Parameter 4 -Way of administration For caudata species that tolerate the relatively high temperature of 25°C, this is by far the preferred method. Animals can be treated in large groups both in terrestrial and aquatic species, there is no impact on the environment (contamination with antimicrobial drugs) and this procedure may be suitable during quarantine of imported caudata species that tolerate this temperature. Among European species, the ones that could tolerate such high temperature (> 25°C) are at least Triturus dobrogicus, usually kept at 15°C, with critical thermal maximum (CT max) of 36.8°C AE 0.2 (Gvozdik et al. 2007) ; Ommatotriton vittatus (kept at 10°C) with CT max of 34.2°C (Warburg 1971) and S. infraimmaculata (kept at 10°C) with CT max of 32.5°C (Warburg 1971) .
Antimicrobial treatment is laborious, consisting of a labour-intensive protocol of bathing (polymyxin E), spraying (voriconazole) and housing at a temperature of 20°C. Treatment fluids that are disposed of may end up in the environment. ). An importation ban is an alternative approach but may drive amphibian movements across borders. The trade is well aware of Bsal and has issued guidelines for their members. In a joint report of the Ornamental Fish International, Ornamental Aquatic Trade Association, the Reptile and Exotic Pet Trade Association and the Pet Industry Federation, they support quarantine measures and testing of animals for entry control, restricting salamander movements for potential Bsal hosts, a tracking system for captive caudata, the implementation of biosecurity measures and raising public awareness (Joint Response, 2017) . Effective prevention, however, requires knowledge of the route of entry of Bsal in Europe. Although traffic in live amphibians is generally considered a major route, further studies about entry routes of chytrid fungus infections are needed.
2) preventing introduction of Bsal in na € ıve regions from outbreak regions To prevent spill-over from Bsal from outbreak areas into na € ıve areas, field protocols have been put in place, which emphasise proper disinfection of all materials between amphibian populations visited.
The implementation of these protocols is obligatory for field workers who ask for permits in Flanders (see below) and similar biocontrol measures are advised but not officially imposed in the Netherlands (advised by RAVON Foundation -Reptile, Amphibian and Fish Conservation Netherlands) and Germany (advised by Trier University). In Flanders, a perimeter of 1 km has been defined around a Bsal locality (Duffel). No permits are being delivered by the authorities for field activities within this perimeter.
Summary of measures imposed by the Flemish government (ANB) for field activities in response to the emergence of Bsal:
• Manipulation of amphibians is allowed only when strictly necessary • Either disposable vinyl gloves should be worn when handling amphibians or hands should be disinfected after handling • All materials used must be cleaned and disinfected between sites and preferably on-site, including clothes that made contact with the environment. Virkon 1% should be used as disinfectant. Alternatively, heating at 60°C for 30 min is accepted. This measure also applies to: À amphibian monitoring activities À all activities in amphibian habitats (not necessarily limited to activities pertaining to amphibians)
• Vehicles should be parked on paved roads wherever possible • Dead or ill amphibians should only be handled with gloves • For actions targeted at reducing road mortality during spring migration, one dedicated set of material per site should be used • For education oriented projects, only a single freshwater locality per day can be visited • For monitoring projects, all materials must be cleaned and disinfected between sites as mentioned before
• For all activities in amphibian habitats (not necessarily limited to activities pertaining to amphibians) all materials must be cleaned and disinfected between sites as mentioned before.
Public education by means of information panels informs visitors to outbreak sites in some areas (for example Robertville in Wallonia, Bunde in the Netherlands: Figure 3 ). Raising public awareness through general media is important to alert people when dead amphibians are encountered in the field and to encourage using proper hygienic measures before and after visit to amphibian populations. In the countries were Bsal outbreaks are currently ongoing in natural populations, all amphibians are strictly protected by law. Preferably, outbreak sites should be closed for recreational use and for any non-essential activity to limit opportunities of Bsal spread through human activities.
The fast identification of a Bsal outbreak in the field and the instalment of an early warning system should prevent Bsal spread and introduction in na € ıve regions from outbreak regions. A network of diagnostic laboratories is currently being built across Europe in the framework of EC Tender ENV.B.3/ SER/2016/0028. An early warning system (passive and sometimes active monitoring) is in place in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands and this will be implemented across the EU in the framework of the above mentioned EC Tender ENV.B.3/SER/2016/0028. Passive monitoring consists of the detection and collection of suspect cases/mortality by any stakeholder visiting amphibian habitats (field workers, recreational users, scientists, hunters, etc.), followed by specific examination for the presence of Bsal. Passive monitoring appears as the most appropriate method for Bsal detection in caudata species as the infection is associated with mortality. Active monitoring consists of detecting Bsal in swab samples in amphibian populations.
According to different minimum expected prevalences and population sizes and assuming 100% test Sp, the sample size needed to provide the 95% probability of detecting at least one positive animal is reported in Table 3 . Since the test Se was derived using experimentally infected animals, it may be possible that this value may be lower when used in the field with naturally infected populations. For this reason and with the aim of being conservative, 80.4% Se, the lower confidence bound computed using the data from one of the three laboratories (the one with the lowest sensitivity) reported in Section 3.1.4.1, has been used to estimate the sample sizes as in Table 3 . Additionally, it needs to be noted that it is not clear whether there exist other fungi or organisms in natural populations that could cross-react with Bsal, in which case they would give false positive test results, resulting in specificity lower than 100%. In the estimates provided in Table 3 , the effect of dealing with different wild animal species not homogenously distributed in space has not been taken into account. Therefore, active monitoring, if not designed according to the different factors affecting the population size and the geographical distribution of the host and the pathogen, could have very low probability in detecting Bsal in the salamander populations.
The design prevalence of 1%, 3% and 10% are chosen as examples. Where the disease has an epidemic behaviour as currently in Europe, the prevalence in outbreak area can be expected to be > 10%, whereas 3% could be considered as the minimum expected prevalence value registered in endemic areas as in Asia (see Section 3.1.1.2), thus such a design prevalence could be used for limiting the introduction of the disease into EU from endemic countries, e.g. in consignment of salamanders from Asia. Similarly, in the graph in Figure 4 , it is possible to visualise the trend of sample size according to increasing population size and to the different minimum expected prevalence.
Several organisations (e.g. in Belgium Natuurpunt, Natagora, Ghent University and the Flemish and Wallonian government; in the Netherlands RAVON, the Dutch government) collaborate in the establishment of regional hotlines, where suspect cases can be reported.
Ex situ conservation has been proposed as the sole effective measure in preventing Bsal infected populations of highly susceptible species from going extinct (Stegen et al., 2017) . A captive assurance colony of the remaining fire salamanders exists in the Netherlands (collaboration between zoos, RAVON and the Dutch government) and is envisaged in Flanders in case Bsal would infect local fire salamander populations.
3) preventing Bsal spread between captive and natural caudata populations
No official measures currently exist. Any direct or indirect contact between captive and natural caudata populations must be avoided. If European populations of captive caudata would be screened for the presence of Bsal, with subsequent follow-up to clear existing infections, this, combined with proper entry control and quarantine, may assure Bsal to be absent from captive salamanders, excluding a potentially important source of Bsal for native salamanders.
Raising public awareness by means of presentations on meetings and publications in journals that reach a terrarium audience has been intensively pursued: terrarium keepers, associated with the hobby clubs seem well aware of the problem. The largest association of terrarium enthusiasts in Europe (the Deutsche Gesellschaft f € ur Herpetologie und Terrarienkunde (DGHT)) has published a position paper on Bsal (DGHT, 2016) in which they advise their members to strictly adhere to biosecurity measures, monitor their captive caudata, urge for fast diagnostics and treatment, quarantine and entry control to limit spread of Bsal through captive caudata. The Dutch 'Salamandervereniging', comprising caudata keepers only, advertises similar measures to their members. Overall, the terrarium keepers are highly motivated to eliminate any Bsal infection from captivity given the near total destruction of susceptible species in captive caudata collections once Bsal entered .
Building veterinary capacity across Europe to increase the likelihood that Bsal infections in captivity are diagnosed and treated correctly and quickly should be considered a priority. A network of diagnostic laboratories is currently being built across Europe in the framework of the EC Tender ENV.B.3/SER/2016/0028.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 -Effectiveness of biosecurity measures in preventing the pathogen introduction Biosecurity measures are expected to be crucial in preventing pathogen introduction in natural and captive amphibian populations in na € ıve regions. Feasibility depends on the measures and on the willingness of authorities to implement these measures. Overall, the biosecurity measures proposed above should be easy to implement but conflicts may arise with regional interests (e.g. closure of recreational areas). A further complicating factor is the involvement of non-professionals (the general public, terrarium keepers, and volunteers). For proper implementation of the biosecurity measures, at least the following stakeholders should be motivated to comply with biosecurity measures:
• any person professionally or voluntarily involved in field activities in amphibian habitats (e.g. research, education, habitat restoration, etc.);
• trade through the entire commercial chain; • captive collection holders (zoos, private keepers, ex situ conservation programmes); • any person visiting outbreak sites (several outbreak sites are in important touristic sites that are heavily frequented for recreational use),
Article 7(d)(v) Restrictions on the movement of animals and products
Availability
Parameter 1 -Available movement restriction measures None currently in place.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 -Effectiveness of restriction of animal movement in preventing the between farm spread Restriction of animal movement is applicable to captive animals and it is highly likely to limit spread of Bsal if properly implemented. Release of captive animals in natural amphibian populations should be avoided, unless the released animals have been produced in the framework of a strictly monitored and designed conservation programme taking all necessary biosecurity measures into account, including testing for known amphibian diseases before release. In this respect, the sale of amphibians in garden centres for release in garden ponds should be strongly discouraged or even forbidden.
For amphibians in trade, animal movement of only Bsal-free animals would help in preventing the introduction and further spread of this pathogen.
In case Bsal would be detected in captive salamanders, all movements of animals to and from the infected collection should be strictly avoided until successful treatment and clearance of the fungus from the collection. A generalised transport restriction of salamanders between captive sites is extremely difficult to monitor, since many species can be easily transported in small containers via any transportation means.
For natural populations, any movement of animals between localities (e.g. for translocation, reintroduction, reinforcement) should preferably be restricted to cases with a clear conservation benefit based on sound scientific evidence. In case of movement, all animals to be moved should be clinically healthy and should be free of at least the amphibian pathogens Bsal, Bd and ranaviruses.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 -Feasibility of restriction of animal movement
Restriction of animal movement should be feasible especially in professional organisations (trade, zoos, conservation-oriented organisations). Feasibility in non-professionals (e.g. terrarium keepers) depends on implementation (e.g. efforts spent on continuously raising public awareness) and probably also on the level of the keeper: knowledgeable private keepers associated with hobby clubs or internet fora/social media groups are more likely to be informed than non-knowledgeable people buying newts in pet shops for an ornamental aquarium. This latter category is important since the vast amount of Asian newts imported (H. orientalis, a potential Bsal carrier) most probably ends up with this latter group of keepers who are more difficult to reach.
Article 7(d)(vi) Killing of animals
Availability
Parameter 1 -Available methods for killing animals None. Caudata can be killed by various methods. Injection (intravenously, intracoelomically, intralymphatically) of sodium pentobarbital is deemed acceptable (AVMA, 2013) . Topical application using bathing solutions of anaesthetics such as tricaine methanesulfonate or benzocaine are equally considered acceptable and allow euthanising groups of animals (AVMA, 2013) . Although previously deemed unacceptable, recent evidence suggests cooling and subsequent freezing of amphibians to result in painless death (Shine et al., 2015) and this method can be applied for mass euthanasia.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 -Effectiveness of killing animals (at farm level or within the farm) for reducing/stopping spread of the disease Killing animals could be carried out at three levels:
• Bsal-infected animals in trade: killing in combination with biosecurity measures would effectively stop spread from these animals. However, given the relatively ease and efficacy of the existing treatments and presence of diagnostic tests, treatment should be the preferred option over killing.
• Bsal-infected animals in captive collections: idem as for animals in trade.
• Bsal-infected animals in natural populations: in theory, removing all infected (or even all) animals from a natural population in combination with biosecurity measures would limit the spread of the disease. However, the presence of non-caudata and environmental Bsal reservoirs (Stegen et al., 2017) , combined with a low probability of capturing all caudata in a population, renders success of culling all infected animals in natural populations highly unlikely (Stegen et al., 2017) . Indeed, given its host population density independent epidemiology, removing only a proportion of a population is highly unlikely to stop an outbreak (Stegen et al., 2017) .
Feasibility
Parameter 3 -Feasibility of killing animals Feasibility of killing animals in trade or in captive collections can be considered high but may be strongly opposed by public opinion.
Feasibility of killing a sufficient number of animals in natural populations can be considered not feasible for the reasons mentioned above.
Article 7(d)(vii) Disposal of carcasses and other relevant animal by-products
Availability Parameter 1 -Available disposal option Most dead captive caudata carcasses probably end up in the dustbin together with household waste (although in theory this is generally prohibited). If this waste is subsequently treated (e.g. incineration), this will effectively kill Bsal. When disposed of in open air waste dumps, this might hold a theoretical risk of pathogen spread.
A proper disposal option for caudata carcasses and associated wastes is commercial fixed plant incineration. Disposal of carcasses should include a procedure that inactivates Bsal (and preferably other amphibian diseases such as Bd and ranaviruses), which can be achieved either by thermal treatment (at least 30 min at 60°C) or chemical disinfection (see above).
Carcasses and associated wastes (e.g. soil or water from terraria) should not be disposed of in nature without prior decontamination, since this may result in spill-over of Bsal to native amphibians.
Effectiveness
Parameter 2 -Effectiveness of disposal option
Proper disinfection procedures should result in safe and effective disposal.
Feasibility
Parameter 3 -Feasibility of disposal option High, since caudata typically are small animals of less than 20 cm, relatively small volumes have to be disposed off. Feasibility of disposal of large quantities of contaminated terrarium content can be an issue.
3.1.5. Article 7(e) The impact of disease prevention and control measures 3.1.5.1. Article 7(e)(i) The direct and indirect costs for the affected sectors and the economy as a whole
Parameter 1 -Cost of control (e.g. treatment/vaccine, biosecurity)
Very difficult to quantify and highly depending on the scenario:
• For trade: combination of entry control, quarantine and, if necessary, treatment. The volume of traded caudata represents a minor proportion of the trade (Gilbert et al., 2016) . Costs for Bsal-free caudata in the trade can be included in the price setting of the animals. Overall, caudata are relatively inexpensive (customer prices generally between EUR 10 and 100 per animal). The Asian species traded in the largest numbers and a possible vector for Bsal (H. orientalis) typically sells for low prices (around EUR 10 per animal, see Figure 5 ).
• For keepers of caudata: combination of entry control, quarantine, biosecurity measures (e.g. disinfection of terrarium contents) and, if necessary, treatment. A diagnosis based on the combination of necropsy, histopathology and qPCR costs approximately EUR 100 at the diagnostic centre of Ghent University, allowing group diagnosis of the disease in an infected collection. Depending on the diagnostic laboratory, follow-up of infected collections using qPCR on skin swabs costs between EUR 20 and 50 per swab. The preferred method of treatment (heat) is a low-cost treatment. Currently, keepers of caudata (zoos, conservation programmes and private keepers) have shown motivation to cover these costs, given the far-reaching implications of Bsal infection for the collection's health.
• For natural populations: preventive biosecurity measures as mentioned above do come with a cost (disinfection procedures, public education, early warning system, closure of recreational areas). Active and passive monitoring is currently being supported by governments (Dutch, German and Belgian governments). Costs for passive monitoring are limited to the transportation of carcasses and diagnostic procedures. Costs for active monitoring cover field activities (sampling) and diagnostic procedures. Costs for captive assurance colonies depend on the strategy followed: from mere maintenance of individuals ex situ (requiring staff, infrastructure and material costs) to manage breeding programmes (requiring the same + genetic management). • For captive animals: depending on price setting for compensation/animal. Group treatment or euthanasia for amphibians is relatively low cost. Obligatory follow-up with skin swabs after treatment represents the major cost.
• For natural populations: eradication is currently not considered an option for both technical and ethical concerns (Stegen et al., 2017) .
Parameter 3 -Cost of surveillance and monitoring Surveillance and monitoring, both in animals in captivity and the wild, can be done using qPCR on skin swabs. Apart from the costs associated with collecting the samples, costs of qPCR as mentioned above. Parameter 4 -Trade loss (bans, embargoes, sanctions) by animal product Currently, the USA has banned the importation of caudata based on the risk of introduction of Bsal (US Fish and Wildlife Service, 2016). If the EU would install an importation ban or restriction, this is likely not to result in significant economic losses (although, as mentioned before, this cannot be accurately estimated, given the lack of data with regard to quantities traded).
Parameter 5 -Importance of the disease for the affected sector (% loss or € lost compared to business amount of the sector) This cannot be quantified properly but caudata probably represent a minor proportion in the trade.
Article 7(e)(ii) The societal acceptance of disease prevention and control measures
Probability of societal acceptance of implementation of mitigation measures is expected to be high, even desired, since mitigation of Bsal promotes animal health and welfare and biodiversity conservation. Acceptance will probably depend on the measures imposed and on the explanation/ rationale provided for the measures. While biosecurity measures like entry control, disinfection, public education, restricting trade and curative treatments will probably be readily accepted, culling (certainly of wild animals) may provoke a strong and negative response. The control measures (biosecurity and treatment) increase welfare of captive caudata since this directly improves animal health. Temperature control should not involve caudata species that cannot tolerate high temperature (25°C check) (see Section 3.1.4.3 parameter on treatment). However, there is a lack of knowledge on the impact of the procedures of treatment on the welfare of salamanders.
Parameter 2 -Wildlife depopulation as control measure Although culling of all caudata in an affected wild community might be theoretically a defendable option in an attempt to eliminate Bsal from an infected area, this comes with several, major problems such as: (see also Section 3.1.5.2 above):
• very low probability that depopulation is effective, given the estimated low feasibility of capturing all individuals present at a site;
• the presence of persistent forms of Bsal in the environment creating an ongoing risk; • societal acceptance is most likely very low and adverse reactions from the public, academia and nature conservation organisations can be expected;
• legal issues may prevent depopulation: many European amphibians are strictly protected at national and European level.
Article 7(e)(iv) The environment and biodiversity
Environment
Parameter 1 -Use and potential residuals of biocides or medical drugs in environmental compartments (soil, water, feed, manure) Manufacture and use of disinfectants in the EU must comply with Regulation (EU) No 528/2012 2 . Specific derogations for the use of disinfectants in the field are necessary (e.g. the use of Virkon, currently routinely used). Disposal of disinfectants in the environment (e.g. chlorine) should be strongly discouraged.
Biodiversity
Parameter 2 -Mortality in wild species
The relevance of Bsal in the EU is its potential to cause significant mortality in many wild species of caudata (see above). While mortality in captive species can be counteracted, mortality in wild caudata can currently not be mitigated. Bsal can drive amphibian species to local extinction. This may lead to loss of biodiversity, at least at local level (Martel et al., 2014; Stegen et al., 2017) .
Assessment according to Article 5 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Article 5 of the AHL about Bsal (Table 4 ). The expert judgement was based on Individual and Collective Behavioural Aggregation (ICBA) approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017). Experts have been provided with information of the disease fact-sheet mapped into Article 5 criteria (see supporting information, Annex A), based on that the experts indicate their Y/N or 'na' judgement on each criterion of Article 5, and the reasoning supporting their judgement.
The minimum number of judges in the judgement was 12. The expert judgement was conducted as described in the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017) . For details on the interpretation of the questions see Appendix B of the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017). 3.2.1. Outcome of the assessment of Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans according to criteria of Article 5(3) of the AHL on its eligibility to be listed
As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered eligible to be listed as laid down in Article 5 if it fulfils all criteria of the first set from A(i) to A(v) and at least one of the second set of criteria from B(i) to B(v). According to the assessment methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), a criterion is considered fulfilled when the outcome is 'Yes'. According to the results shown in Table 4 , Bsal complies with all criteria of the first set and with two criteria of the second set, therefore it is considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL.
Assessment according to Article 9 criteria
This section presents the results of the expert judgement on the criteria of Annex IV referring to categories as in Article 9 of the AHL about Bsal (Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9) . The expert judgement was based on ICBA approach described in detail in the opinion on the methodology. Experts have been provided with information of the disease fact-sheet mapped into Article 9 criteria (see supporting information, Annex A), based on that the experts indicate their Y/N or 'na' judgement on each criterion of Article 9, and the reasoning supporting their judgement.
The minimum number of judges in the judgement was 10. The expert judgement was conducted as described in the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017) . For details on the interpretation of the questions see Appendix B of the methodological opinion (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017). The disease may result in high morbidity and significant mortality rates Y At least one criterion to be met by the disease: In addition to the criteria set out above at points 1-2.4, the disease needs to fulfil at least one of the following criteria 3
The disease has a zoonotic potential with significant consequences on public health, including epidemic or pandemic potential OR possible significant threats to food safety N 4(CI) The disease has a significant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals N 4(PI) The disease has a significant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals The disease may result in high morbidity with in general low mortality N At least one criterion to be met by the disease: In addition to the criteria set out above at points 1-2.4, the disease needs to fulfil at least one of the following criteria 3
The disease has a zoonotic potential with significant consequences on public health, including epidemic potential OR possible significant threats to food safety N 4(CI) The disease has a significant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals N 4(PI) The disease has a significant impact on the economy of the Union, causing substantial costs, mainly related to its direct impact on the health and productivity of animals The disease usually does not result in high morbidity and has negligible or no mortality AND often the most observed effect of the disease is production loss OR in aquatic animals the disease may result in high morbidity and usually low mortality AND often the most observed effect of the disease is production loss N At least one criterion to be met by the disease:
In addition to the criteria set out above at points 1-2.4, the disease needs to fulfil at least one of the following criteria 3
The disease has a zoonotic potential with significant consequences on public health, or possible significant threats to food safety N 4(CI) The disease has a significant impact on the economy of parts of the Union, mainly related to its direct impact on certain types of animal production systems N 4(PI) The disease has a significant impact on the economy of parts of the Union, mainly related to its direct impact on certain types of animal production systems N 5(a)(CI) The disease has a significant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour markets N 5(a)(PI) The disease has a significant impact on society, with in particular an impact on labour markets 
Non-consensus-questions
This section displays the assessment related to each criterion of Annex IV referring to the categories of Article 9 of the AHL where no consensus was achieved in form of Tables 10-12. The proportion of Y, N or 'na' answers are reported, followed by the list of different supporting views for each answer.
Reasoning supporting the judgement Supporting Yes for 1 (cat. A):
• The distribution of Bsal is currently very limited, and its presence is still not endemic, although very likely to become, since it will be difficult to avoid spread further given multiple outbreaks in wild species already in diverse locations.
Supporting Yes for 1 (cat. B):
• It is present in wild populations in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands (Spitzen-van der Sluijs et al., 2016) and in captive salamanders in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom (Fitzpatrick et al., 2016; Sabino-Pinto et al., 2015) .
• It appears that the disease can maintain itself in the population without introduction from outside. • Bsal infection leads to a lethal, ulcerative skin disease with high mortality and a clear welfare impact.
• Morbidity is high in some species of European caudata, the salamander population in at least three MSs is affected, so it could be considered a large number of animals.
Supporting No:
• The number of affected animals is not large considering that Bsal has been detected in few locations in Belgium (5), Germany (3) and Netherlands (7).
Outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for
Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans for the purpose of categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL As from the legal text of the AHL, a disease is considered fitting in a certain category (A, B, C, D or E corresponding to point (a) to point (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL) if it is eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) and fulfils all criteria of the first set from 1 to 2.4 and at least one of the second set of criteria from 3 to 5(d) as shown in Tables 5-9. According to the assessment methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), a criterion is considered fulfilled when the outcome is 'Yes'. With respect to different type of impact where the assessment is divided into current and potential impact, a criterion will be considered fulfilled if at least one of the two outcomes is 'Y' and, in case of no 'Y', the assessment is inconclusive if at least one outcome is 'NC'.
A description of the outcome of the assessment of criteria in Annex IV for Bsal for the purpose of categorisation as in Article 9 of the AHL is presented in Table 13 . According to the assessment here performed, Bsal complies with the following criteria of the Sections 1-5 of Annex IV of the AHL for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (a) to (e) of Article 9(1): 1) To be assigned to category A, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the first set (1, 2.1-2.4) and according to the assessment Bsal complies with criteria 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criteria 1 and 2.1. To be eligible for category A, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a-d) and Bsal complies with criteria 5b, 5c and 5d, but not with criteria 3, 4 and 5a. 2) To be assigned to category B, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the first set (1, 2.1-2.4) and according to the assessment Bsal complies with criteria 2.2 and 2.3, but not with criterion 2.4 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criteria 1 and 2.1. To be eligible for category B, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a-d) and Bsal complies with criteria 5b, 5c and 5d, but not with criteria 3, 4 and 5a. 3) To be assigned to category C, a disease needs to comply with all criteria of the first set (1, 2.1-2.4) and according to the assessment Bsal complies with criteria 1, 2.2 and 2.3, but not with criterion 2.4 and the assessment is inconclusive on compliance with criterion 2.1. To be eligible for category C, a disease needs to comply additionally with one of the criteria of the second set (3, 4, 5a-d) and Bsal complies with criteria 5b, 5c and 5d, but not with criteria 3, 4 and 5a. 4) To be assigned to category D, a disease needs to comply with criteria of Sections 1, 2, 3 or 5 of Annex IV of the AHL and with the specific criterion D of Section 4, with which Bsal complies. 5) To be assigned to category E, a disease needs to comply with criteria of Sections 1, 2 or 3 of Annex IV of the AHL and/or the surveillance of the disease is necessary for reasons relating to animal health, animal welfare, human health, the economy, society or the environment. The latter is applicable if a disease fulfils the criteria as in Article 5, with which Bsal complies.
Assessment of Article 8
This section presents the results of the assessment on the criteria of Article 8(3) of the AHL about Bsal. The Article 8(3) criteria are about animal species to be listed, as it reads below:
'3. Animal species or groups of animal species shall be added to this list if they are affected or if they pose a risk for the spread of a specific listed disease because: Impact on economy Impact on society Impact on animal welfare Impact on environment Impact on biodiversity
AHL assessment on Batrachochytrium salamandrivorans (Bsal) a) they are susceptible for a specific listed disease or scientific evidence indicates that such susceptibility is likely; or b) they are vector species or reservoirs for that disease, or scientific evidence indicates that such role is likely'.
For this reason, the assessment on Article 8 criteria is based on the evidence as extrapolated from the relevant criteria of Article 7, i.e. the ones related to susceptible and reservoir species or routes of transmission, which cover also possible role of biological or mechanical vectors. 3 According to the mapping, as presented in Table 5 , Section 3.2 of the scientific opinion on the ad hoc methodology (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2017), the main animal species to be listed for Bsal according to the criteria of Article 8(3) of the AHL are as displayed in Table 14 .
Conclusions
TOR 1: for each of those diseases an assessment, following the criteria laid down in Article 7 of the AHL, on its eligibility of being listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL; • According to the assessment here performed, Bsal complies with all criteria of the first set and with two criteria of the second set and therefore can be considered eligible to be listed for Union intervention as laid down in Article 5(3) of the AHL.
TOR 2a: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, an assessment of its compliance with each of the criteria in Annex IV to the AHL for the purpose of categorisation of diseases in accordance with Article 9 of the AHL;
• According to the assessment here performed, Bsal meets the criteria as in Sections 4 and 5 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in points (d) and (e) of Article 9(1) of the AHL. According to the assessment here performed, it is inconclusive whether Bsal complies with the criteria as in Section 1 of Annex IV of the AHL, for the application of the disease prevention and control rules referred to in point (a) of Article 9(1) of the AHL. Compliance of Bsal with the criteria as in Section 1 is dependent on a decision on criteria 1 and 2.1.
TOR 2b: for each of the diseases which was found eligible to be listed for Union intervention, a list of animal species that should be considered candidates for listing in accordance with Article 8 of the AHL.
• According to the assessment here performed, the animal species that can be considered to be listed for Bsal according to Article 8(3) of the AHL are species of the families Salamandridae and Plethodontidae as susceptible and reservoirs, as reported in Table 14 in Section 3.4 of the present document.
